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ABSTRACT 
This aƌtiĐle aiŵs to ŵake a ŵethodologiĐal ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the ͚aƌguŵeŶtatiǀe tuƌŶ͛ iŶ poliĐǇ 
aŶalǇsis aŶd to the uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of the puďliĐ deďate oŶ the UK goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s austeƌitǇ poliĐies. It 
suggests that policy arguments are practical arguments from circumstances, goals and means-goal 
relations to practical conclusions (proposals) that can ground decision and action. Practical 
proposals are evaluated in light of their potential consequences. The article proposes a deliberation 
scheme and a set of critical questions for the evaluation of deliberation and decision-making in 
conditions of incomplete knowledge (uncertainty and risk). It illustrates these questions by 
analyzing a corpus of articles from five newspapers over the two months following the adoption of 
the fiƌst austeƌitǇ Budget iŶ JuŶe ϮϬϭϬ. It also suggests hoǁ ͚fƌaŵiŶg͛ fuŶĐtioŶs iŶ deliďeƌatioŶ aŶd 
decision-ŵakiŶg, aŶd hoǁ aŶalǇsis of ͚fƌaŵiŶg͛ ĐaŶ ďe iŶtegƌated ǁith the aŶalǇsis aŶd eǀaluatioŶ 
of argumentation. 
Keywords: austerity, Budget, critical questions, decision-making, deliberation, framing, metaphor, 
policy evaluation, practical argument, uncertainty and risk 
 
1. Introduction 
The austerity policies iŶitiated iŶ ϮϬϭϬ ďǇ the UK͛s CoŶseƌǀatiǀe aŶd Liďeƌal-Democrat coalition 
government have so far involved a systematic programme of public spending cuts and tax rises 
aimed at reducing the budget deficit and helping Britain recover from the effects of the financial 
crisis. In this paper1  I will focus on the way in which the argument for austerity made by George 
Osborne in his first Budget speech (22 June 2010) was received by economic analysts and 
journalists in a range of daily newspapers, at the time when it was first made. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is always possible to say that a course of action which seemed reasonable at some 
point in the past, in light of everything that was known or could have been known at the time, was 
not in fact reasonable. This is different from a situation when a course of action turns out to have 
been unreasonable  in light of facts that could and ought to have been known at the time but were 
ignored or disregarded ;e.g. aƌguaďlǇ, BƌitaiŶ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the iŶǀasioŶ of IƌaƋͿ. It is only in the 
former situation that the fallibility of human knowledge can be legitimately invoked as an excuse. 
This analysis addresses the public debate on austerity at a time when there was no hindsight, which 
is the typical context for practical decisions, namely a situation of incomplete knowledge – 
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2 
 
uncertainty and risk – when practical proposals have to be assessed on the basis of their potential 
consequences, given all the knowledge available to the deliberating agents.  
͚Uncertainty͛ means that it is genuinely impossible to predict how things will turn out (i.e. there are 
͚uŶkŶoǁŶ uŶkŶoǁŶs͛ that will interfere with the most carefully planned out course of action). ͚Risk͛ 
means that the possible outcomes are known in principle, but which outcome will materialize is 
hard to predict. Uncertainty cannot be reduced to risk, as risk presupposes some calculation is 
possible. As Keynes (1971-89, cited in Parsons 2012) warned, economic policy involves primarily 
uncertainty rather than risk, as it unfolds against a background of unknown future events and 
developments about which little, if any, calculation of probability can be made. This 
notwithstanding, he argued, under pressure to act, agents often go ahead on the assumption that 
uncertainties are risks, that the future can be predicted in terms of what we know about the past, 
often with disastrous consequences – as the financial crisis has itself shown.  
In addition to being an empirical study, this article develops the analytical framework for the 
evaluation of practical arguments in political discourse presented in Fairclough & Fairclough (2012), 
ǁheƌe a ŵoƌe sǇsteŵatiĐ ͚aƌguŵeŶtatiǀe tuƌŶ͛ ǁas adǀoĐated foƌ the field of CƌitiĐal DisĐouƌse 
Analysis (CDA). It thus aims to make a methodological ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ to the ͚aƌguŵeŶtatiǀe tuƌŶ͛ iŶ 
policy studies (Fischer & Gottweis 2012) by proposing a set of critical questions for the evaluation 
of practical arguments in deliberative activity types. It also briefly indicates how the concept of 
͚framing͛ relates to the evaluation of argument.  
For the purpose of this analysis, 461 media texts, published over the interval 15 June – 15 August 
2010, were selected from The Guardian (121 articles), The Daily Telegraph (105), The Daily Mail 
(93), The Financial Times (92), and The Sun (50), with a combined total of around 315,000 words.2 
The first section briefly introduces the concepts of practical argumentation, deliberation and critical 
questioning. The second provides a brief illustration of the way in which each critical question was 
used in the media debate on austerity in June-August 2010. The third section looks at a selection of 
data in more detail, in relation to one critical question, and shows how frame analysis can fit into 
analysis and evaluation of argumentation. 
 
2. Critical questions for the evaluation of policy as practical argument  
 
In discussing the public response to austerity policies, I start from the practical argument scheme 
originally defined by Walton (2006, 2007a, 2007b), which I am re-expressing as argumentation from 
circumstances, goals and a means-goal relation (Fairclough & Fairclough 2011, 2012): 
The agent is in circumstances C. 
The agent has a goal G (generated by a particular normative source.) 
Generally speaking, if an agent does A in C, then G will be achieved. 
Therefore, the Agent ought to do A. 
 
I suggest the following situation as a starting point: an (individual or collective) agent having a 
stated goal G in a set of circumstances C, proposing a course of action A (or several such proposals), 
that would presumably transform their current circumstances into the future state-of-affairs 
corresponding to their goal G. (The goal is underlain by a concern for the realization of some value, 
desire, obligation, etc.) Based on all the knowledge available, the agent is conjecturing that they 
3 
 
ought to do A1 (or A2 or A3…Ϳ to aĐhieǀe G iŶ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes C. IŶ order to decide rationally, the 
agent should subject each of these alternatives (hypotheses) to critical testing, trying to expose 
potential negative consequences of each. A pragmatic argument from negative consequence (left-
hand side of Figure 1) can potentially rebut the practical proposal (conclusion) itself, whereas 
challenges to the validity of the argument or to the truth of the premises cannot show that the 
proposal is unreasonable but merely that it does not follow from the premises. The pragmatic 
argument from negative consequence has this form: 
 
If the agent does A (adopts proposal A), consequence (effect) E will follow. 
Consequence E is unacceptable. 
Therefore, the agent ought not to do A (adopt proposal A). 
 
Van Eemeren (2010: 138-143) distinguishes among abstract genres (e.g. deliberation), activity types 
(e.g. parliament or policy debate) and concrete speech events (e.g. particular examples of such 
debates). Deliberation is a genre common to many activity types whose intended outcome is a 
normative-practical conclusion that can, in principle, ground decision and action. I suggest that 
argumentation in deliberative activity types can be succinctly represented as follows (Figure 1), 
where the conclusion of the practical argument from goals and circumstances (centre) is tested by a 
pragmatic argument from consequence (left). Any action has both intended and unintended 
consequences, and the latter may be foreseeable or not. Fƌoŵ a ĐƌitiĐ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the 
foreseeable unintended effects (consequences) can be such that the action had better not be 
performed, even if the intended effect can be achieved by doing A. The intended effect (i.e. the 
goal) itself can be unacceptable. If either of these is the case, a critical objection to A has been 
exposed and the hypothesis that the agent ought to do A has been refuted (rebutted).  However, if 
the negative consequences, while unacceptable in principle, do not constitute critical objections 
against A (this could be because there is some ͚PlaŶ B͛ oƌ mitigating strategy in place, or because 
they can be traded off against positive consequences), then the conclusion in favour of A may still 
stand, in spite of these counter-considerations. 
Practical claims can also be supported by arguments from positive consequence. The argument 
from goals can itself be seen as an argument from positive consequence. Positive consequences 
also include desirable side effects that are not explicitly intended (are not goals that agents start 
from), but can be predicted to occur. The right-hand side of Figure 1 represents the arguments 
from (intended or unintended) positiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe ;E͛Ϳ that allegedly count in favour of the 
conclusion. Figure 1 is a development of the schema proposed in Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 
connecting two argument schemes, the practical argument from goals and the pragmatic argument 
from consequence; it also shows how explanations may be related to the argument. 3 
The decision to adopt proposal A is reasonable if the hypothesis that A is the right course of action 
has been subjected to critical testing in light of all the knowledge available and has withstood all 
attempts to find critical objections against it. By critical objection I understand an overriding reason 
why the action should not be performed, i.e. a reason that is not overridden by another reason that 
has Ŷoƌŵatiǀe pƌioƌitǇ iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt, iŶ the pƌoĐess of ͚ǁeighiŶg͛ ƌeasoŶs that ĐhaƌaĐteƌizes 
deliberative activity types. The primary point of critical questioning is not to narrow down a range 
of alteƌŶatiǀe pƌoposals to the oŶe aŶd oŶlǇ ͚ďest͛ oŶe, ďut to eliŵiŶate the ĐleaƌlǇ uŶƌeasoŶaďle 
ones from a set of alternatives. The underlying conception is a critical rationalist view of the 
function of argument and of rational decision-making (Miller 1994, forthcoming). 
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Figure 1. Proposal for the structure of practical reasoning in deliberative activity types 
 
Walton (2007b) talks about three ways of challenging a practical argument: challenging the 
premises, the conclusion and the inference. In the set of questions suggested below, some critical 
questions (CQ4 and CQ5) attempt to test the practical proposal (conclusion) and may indicate that 
it is unreasonable and ought to be abandoned. Other questions (CQ1-CQ3) attempt to undermine 
the premises of the argument from goals, questioning their ƌatioŶal aĐĐeptaďilitǇ ;͚tƌuth͛ for short, 
here). Finally, CQ6 attempts to defeat the inference from premises to conclusion, by indicating that 
there may be other facts that can be added to the premise set in light of which the conclusion no 
longer follows. 
The following questions (Table 1) should be asked from the perspective of the critic, as  antagonist, 
in order to evaluate a practical proposal (and the argument that allegedly supports it) being put 
forward by an arguer (as agent, or on behalf of an agent), as protagonist. The numbering of 
questions from 1 to 6 should not be taken to mean that they need asking in this strict order, i.e. 
CQ1-CQ3 before CQ4-CQ6, as the questions are of three different types. 4 
 
 
Challenging the ƌatioŶal aĐĐeptaďilitǇ ;͚tƌuth͛Ϳ of the premises 
CQ1 Is it true that, in principle, doing A leads to G?   
CQ2   Is it true that the Agent is in circumstances C?  
CQ3 Is it true that the Agent actually has the stated goals and values (motives)? 
 
 
 
Challenging the reasonableness of the conclusion 
CQ4 Are the intended consequences of A (i.e. the goal) acceptable? 
CQ5 Are the foreseeable unintended consequences (e.g. risks) of A acceptable?   
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Challenging the inference 
CQ6 [Among reasonable alternatives,] is A comparatively better in the context?  
 
 
Table 1. Critical questions for the evaluation of practical arguments 
 
Critical questioning in the format above integrates deliberation about means and deliberation 
about goals within a single recursive procedure. A successful challenge will redirect the deliberative 
process to some antecedent stage or to the starting point. If the foreseeable side effects are 
unacceptable, then a new practical proposal has to be made and the testing procedure will start 
again. If the goal itself is unacceptable, then deliberation may want to start again with a revised 
goal, prior to making a new conjecture about the right means to deliver it. The arguer (agent) may 
of course deny that any of these critical challenges have been successful. For example, s/he may 
deny that doing A will have the predicted side effects E or that those effects would be on balance 
unacceptable (e.g. on balance undesirable or normatively inappropriate). 
 
3. Challenging and defending austerity 
All of the above lines of criticism were pursued from the start in the public media debate on 
austerity policies in the months of June, July and August 2010. One line of attack implicitly 
challenged the means-goal premise (CQ1), with economists, journalists and politicians questioning 
the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s apparent belief in the possibility of economic recovery by means of spending 
cuts. BƌiŶgiŶg eǆaŵples fƌoŵ the Gƌeat DepƌessioŶ aŶd JapaŶ͛s histoƌǇ of stagŶatioŶ, some argued 
that austerity, as means, always fails to deliver the intended goals. In other words, based on all 
available information about particular cases in the past – which indicates that, in similar situations, 
by killing demand, austerity has always worsened the economic situation – it is not rationally 
acceptable that austerity can in principle deliver economic recovery. In the Financial Times, Martin 
Wolf (2010b) argued that ͚iŶ the current circumstances, the belief that a concerted fiscal tightening 
across the developed world would prove expansionary is, to put it ŵildlǇ, optiŵistiĐ͛, if Ŷot ͚heƌoiĐ͛ 
– a ͚ŵǇthiĐal ďelief͛ iŶ the ͚ĐoŶfideŶĐe faiƌǇ͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Paul KƌugŵaŶ (2010a), in the New York 
Times. Others claimed, on the contrary, that it is perfectly possible for austerity to lead to recovery. 
͚Austerity dƌiǀes ĐaŶ uŶleash ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚there is every chance growth can resume even as 
cuts take hold͛; ͚though seeŵiŶglǇ a paƌadoǆ, eǆpaŶsioŶaƌǇ fisĐal ĐoŶtƌaĐtioŶs aƌe Ŷot a figŵeŶt of 
eĐoŶoŵists͛ iŵagiŶatioŶ͛ aŶd can be illustrated with successful examples from recent history – 
Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s (Monson & Subramanian 2010).   
Whether or not the means-goal premise is acceptable depends on how convincing is the evidence 
that supports it, and the evidence was interpreted in radically different ways. In the Austerity 
debate hosted by the Financial Times in July 2010, those who argued for immediate fiscal 
retrenchment on the basis of alleged evidence for ͚expansionary fiscal contraction͛ were accused of 
misinterpreting the evidence or ͚ƌejeĐtiŶg the ĐouŶsels of histoƌǇ͛ ;DeLoŶg ϮϬϭϬͿ, but so were those 
who advocated postponing the cuts until growth had resumed.  While, for Niall Ferguson (2010), all 
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the evidence pointed to the incorrectness of the Keynesian position (͚todaǇ͛s ŵodeƌŶ KeǇŶesiaŶs 
have learnt nothing͛), for Robert Skidelsky and Michael Kennedy (2010), Keynes was right to argue 
that ͚the boom, not the slump, is the right time foƌ austeƌitǇ at the TƌeasuƌǇ͛.  
If the argument does not survive critical questioning at this stage (CQ1), the arguer is expected to 
revise the means-goal relation, which may mean either choosing an alternative means or combining 
the chosen means with some other, if in itself it is insufficient in view of the goal.  In the Financial 
Times, for example, Jeffrey Sachs (2010) argued that, while austerity is not sufficient for recovery, it 
should not be abandoned, but should be coupled with other policies – with ͚loŶg-term investments 
iŶ phǇsiĐal aŶd huŵaŶ Đapital as the pƌopeƌ ǁaǇ ďaĐk to sustaiŶed gƌoǁth͛. ͚Fiscal adjustment and 
higher medium-term growth͛ should ďe ͚tǁiŶ poliĐǇ goals͛ ;El-Erian 2010).  
 
CQ2 amouŶts to askiŶg ǁhetheƌ the ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes ;iŶĐludiŶg the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛Ϳ aƌe as theǇ aƌe ďeiŶg 
described. Commentators both agreed and disagreed with the government͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatioŶ of the 
current situation in Britain: a situatioŶ of ŶatioŶal ͚eŵeƌgeŶĐǇ͛, an economy in ruins (͚the ruins of 
aŶ eĐoŶoŵǇ ďuilt oŶ deďt͛Ϳ, facing threats of insolvency similar to ones faced by Greece, where the 
state is ͚ĐƌoǁdiŶg out͛ the pƌiǀate seĐtoƌ aŶd the fiŶaŶĐial seĐtoƌ is dispƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ laƌge 
compared to manufacturing. The associated explanation for the current state of affairs (it was all 
Laďouƌ͛s fault) was accepted by some and rejected by others. In The Guardian, Jonathan Freedland 
(2010b) argued that the case against austerity would not be made convincingly until Labour 
managed to ͚win the blame game͛ aŶd eǆplode the ͚ŵǇth .... that BƌoǁŶ, Ŷot ďaŶkeƌs, Đaused ouƌ 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ ǁoes͛. The real cause of the deficit, he said, was the bank bailout, the ͚Đolossal ďoƌƌoǁiŶg 
Labour had to undertake in order to prevent the crash of 2008 engulfing the entire economy͛; 
ultimately, the cause was ͚the laƌĐeŶous gƌeed of ďaŶkeƌs͛5. On the contrary, according to an 
editorial in The Sun (The Sun says, 2010) on the day of the Budget speech, ͚the nation is clear who it 
ďlaŵes foƌ BƌitaiŶ͛s deďts: LABOU‘͛. The crisis was caused by excessive consumption, living on 
borrowed money and by irresponsible state spending on a welfare system that rewards only those 
ǁho pƌefeƌ ͚ǁalloǁiŶg iŶ state-spoŶsoƌed idleŶess͛ ;‘aŶdall ϮϬϭϬ, in The Daily Telegraph).   
The stated motives of action were also questioned (CQ3). Normally, it is taken for granted that a 
proposal is based on the stated goals and values. But sometimes arguments are rationalizations: 
the overt, stated reasons are not the real reasons, and there are other, covert reasons driving the 
proposed action (Audi 2006). It was argued that austerity policies are in fact ideology-driven: ͚the 
real reason has to do a lot with ideology: the Tories are using the deficit as an excuse to downsize 
the ǁelfaƌe state͛ ǁhile usiŶg the ͚the offiĐial ƌatioŶale͛ that ͚theƌe is Ŷo alteƌŶatiǀe͛ ;KƌugŵaŶ 
2010b). The goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͚real goal͛ is, allegedly, to ͚Đoŵplete the deŵolitioŶ joď oŶ ǁelfaƌe states 
that ǁas staƌted iŶ the ϭϵϴϬs͛ ;Elliott ϮϬϭϬa).    
According to the Budget speech, the government was committed both to being effective in 
reducing the deficit and to doing so in a way that was fair to the population. Constant invocation of 
this douďle ;aŶd ofteŶ tƌipleͿ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt ;͚ƌesponsibility, freedoŵ, faiƌŶess͛Ϳ iŵplied that the 
proposal being presented to the public as the result of deliberation was informed by all these 
normative sources, that none had been sacrificed. However, many journalists Đited the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s 
eǆpƌessioŶs ͚tough ďut faiƌ͛ aŶd ͚ǁe aƌe all iŶ this togetheƌ͛ iŶ oƌdeƌ to ƋuestioŶ that faiƌŶess ǁas a 
genuine concern – see the Guardian headlines: ͚OsďoƌŶe͛s Đlaiŵs of faiƌŶess aƌe Ŷoǁ eǆposed as a 
fƌaud͛ ;MilŶe ϮϬϭϬͿ oƌ ͚‘ooted iŶ defiĐit-slashing superstition, this budget will hit the poor hardest: 
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The faiƌŶess OsďoƌŶe tƌuŵpets is skiŶ deep͛ ;FƌeedlaŶd ϮϬϭϬaͿ. This is Polly Toynbee͛s ĐoŵŵeŶt, iŶ 
The Guardian, on the morning after the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s Budget speech:  
The ǁoƌd ͞pƌogƌessiǀe͟ Đƌossed the flooƌ ǇesteƌdaǇ aŶd eŶteƌed the lexicon of the right. If 
these ǁeƌe the pƌoŵised ͞pƌogƌessiǀe Đuts͟, theŶ the ǁoƌd ǀaŶished iŶto the ƌealŵ of 
double-think. True, some Lib Dem yellow ribbons decorated the handle of the axe, but they 
barely impeded the sǁiŶg of the eǆeĐutioŶeƌ͛s aƌŵ. ;...Ϳ ͞FaiƌŶess͟ ƌepeated oǀeƌ aŶd oǀeƌ 
will not make it so. (...) The coalition has opted for cuts far beyond anything the markets 
expected or demanded. Why? The reason can only be ideological. (Toynbee 2010)  
Overall, The Guardian’s verdict was that the Budget ǁas ͚Tough ďut UŶfaiƌ͛ ;headliŶeͿ, ͚ƌegƌessiǀe͛ 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ ͚pƌogƌessiǀe͛, ͚a ĐlassiĐ ToƌǇ ďudget of ďƌokeŶ pƌoŵises aŶd uŶfaiƌŶess͛.  By contrast, 
The Sun teŶded to agƌee that ͚the paiŶ has ďeeŶ spƌead faiƌlǇ, with the better-off hit hard while 
those at the ďottoŵ aƌe pƌoteĐted͛, and cited  a YouGov poll according to which 57% of the 
respondents thought Osborne had made the right decision, with only 27% thinking the Budget was 
unfair.6 
Appeals to fairness were used in very different ways: for some arguers, fairness genuinely informed 
action; for others, it manifestly did not but ought to have done. This is to say that the argument 
either did or did not pass the test of CQ3. In addition to challenging fairness as a genuine motive 
(CQ3), the austerity Budget was challenged in light of how its consequences would affect the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s institutional obligation to act fairly, in the process of weighing reasons (CQ5). 
According to the critics, fairness was being sacrificed in the process of pursuing the goals; this was 
advanced as a very strong argument against austerity by those who took the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
commitment to fairness to be non-overridable (an institutional constraint on action). More often, 
though, fairness was uŶdeƌstood aĐĐoƌdiŶg to a ŵeƌitoĐƌatiĐ, ͚deseƌt͛ ĐoŶĐeptioŶ – one that accords 
with popular common sense – and not in relation to justice or equality. This may explain the 
general acceptance of cuts in the welfare budget on the strength of the argument (made by The 
Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail or The Sun) that welfare spending cuts have to be made for the sake of 
fairness: ͚ǁe ŵust all ďeaƌ ouƌ faiƌ shaƌe of the ďuƌdeŶ of paǇiŶg off the defiĐit͛, ͚it is oŶlǇ faiƌ the 
uŶioŶs aĐĐept the Ŷeed foƌ effiĐieŶĐies͛, aŶd the ͚state͛s disgƌaĐeful iŶdulgeŶĐe of ǁelfaƌe-guzzling 
laǇaďouts͛ has to Đoŵe to aŶ eŶd. This argument said that fairness was not being sacrificed, thanks 
to the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s effoƌts to ͚spƌead the paiŶ faiƌlǇ͛, pƌoteĐt the ǁoƌst-off, and demand more 
fƌoŵ those ǁith the ͚ďƌoadest shouldeƌs͛. Though rarely, the argument was also heard (in The Daily 
Telegraph) that fairness had to be sacrificed because there was no alternative. 7 
Questions 1-3 challenge the truth of the premises (indicating they may need revising) but leave the 
proposal (conclusion) itself intact: a satisfactory answer to these questions does not mean that the 
proposal itself is reasonable. By comparison, CQ4 and CQ5 can rebut the conclusion of the 
argument.  CQ4 asks whether the stated goal (as intended consequence) is, on balance, acceptable, 
and CQ5 asks whether the side effects of the action (the unintended consequences) are, on 
balance, acceptable, as far as they can be foreseen, based on all the facts at the critics͛ disposal. 
Critical testing at this stage can yield critical objections that cannot be overridden, thus indicating 
that the proposal ought to be abandoned. Once a proposal is conclusively rejected, deliberating 
agents would need to return to the starting point and start testing another proposal 
(alternative).The question is: which considerations (reasons) can and ought to override others in 
evaluating a particular alternative? The political field, as an institutional order, is the realm of 
deontic reasons for action (Searle 2010) – rights, obligations, commitments, entitlements, 
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authorizations, prohibitions. These function as external (desire-independent) constraints on action 
and cannot be easily overridden: political actors are expected to act in a certain way whether they 
want to or not (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 2013). 
Criticism of practical proposals on the grounds of their likely undesirable consequences (CQ4, CQ5) 
was widely used in the aftermath of the Budget speech. While some of the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s long-term 
stated goals (a ͚faiƌeƌ BƌitaiŶ ...where prosperity is shared among all sections of society and all parts 
of the ĐouŶtƌǇ͛) were hard to challenge, critics of austerity called for a fundamental redefinition of 
what they saw as the immediate goals of action, for a new political vision. According to Caroline 
LuĐas, iŶstead of ͚slashiŶg puďliĐ speŶdiŶg iŶ the hope of ƌesuŵiŶg ďusiŶess as usual͛, the 
goveƌŶŵeŶt should ͚seize this oppoƌtuŶitǇ to ƌeĐoŶfiguƌe the deeplǇ uŶsustaiŶaďle eĐoŶoŵiĐ 
system which has helped push us towards financial meltdown͛ (Elliott 2011). If the goal was a 
return to business-as-usual, to the same system that had caused the crisis, as the ͚soft touch 
approaĐh to the CitǇ͛ ;Elliott ϮϬϭϬď) seemed to indicate, then austerity was in need of radical 
transformation at the level of goals (i.e. it failed CQ4). 
Regarding the unintended consequences (CQ5), opponents of austerity pointed to the likely 
catastrophic consequences of cutting expenditure too soon and too quickly, for example a surge in 
unemployment, particularly amongst young people. Not only would austerity fail to realize its own 
stated goals (because a combination of low growth in tax receipts and high growth in welfare 
spending would require more borrowing, which would only increase the existing debt), but it would 
clash with existing political commitments (institutional facts) – it would be unjust, it would damage 
lives – and therefore with concerns that the government was expected to have. In The Daily 
Telegraph, for example, Mary Riddell (2010) ǁaƌŶed that ͚the ǀeƌǇ faďƌiĐ of soĐietǇ ǁill ďe put at 
ƌisk ďǇ this uŶfaiƌ Budget͛ aŶd that ͚diƌeĐtiŶg saǀage speŶdiŶg Đuts at the ǇouŶg is a daŶgeƌous 
Đouƌse foƌ aŶǇ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt to puƌsue͛, foƌĐiŶg theŵ ͚doǁŶ the loŶg ƌoad to peƌditioŶ͛. In turn, 
defenders of austerity pointed to the likely catastrophic consequences of failing to deal with the 
deďt: loss of ďusiŶess ĐoŶfideŶĐe, a doǁŶgƌade of BƌitaiŶ͛s Đƌedit ƌatiŶg, leadiŶg to higheƌ iŶteƌest 
rates, which would increase the existing debt.  In both cases, the argument was that the anticipated 
consequences would uŶdeƌŵiŶe the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s stated goals (to reduce the debt) and other 
widely accepted, legitimate goals (keeping unemployment down, retaining business confidence), as 
well as going against a range of reasons which, depending on which conclusion was defended, were 
deemed to be in principle non-overridable: existing commitments to fairness or justice, to financial 
responsibility and the national interest. Foƌ eǆaŵple, iŶ ǁaƌŶiŶg that ͚[the Liďeƌal DeŵoĐƌats] piĐk 
up aŶ aǆe that ǁill iŶfliĐt gƌeat paiŶ oŶ those theǇ oŶĐe ǀoǁed to pƌoteĐt͛, Freedland (2010a) was 
not only referring to potentially unacceptable ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes ;͚gƌeat paiŶ͛Ϳ ďut also at the saŵe time 
making it clear that, in his view, the promises that the Liberal Democrats had made during the 
electoral campaign gave them non-overridable deontic reasons for action which their current 
action placed them at odds with.  
It is also possible to conclude that the potential side effects of a policy proposal would be in 
principle unacceptable, but do not constitute critical objections to it (i.e. the case for austerity 
stands in spite of counter-considerations). This could be for several reasons, all making implicit or 
explicit reference to a notion of strategy. It may be the case that an effective way of dealing with 
the side effects (should they arise) has already been identified: there is a ͚Plan B͛ that the agent can 
switch over to, if faced with negative feedback. There may also be a broader strategy in place, 
involving actions whose role is to mitigate the negative effects of doing A. For example, while 
austerity is increasing unemployment, the government could be simultaneously engaging in a job-
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creation strategy; or while the state sector is being shrunk, the private sector could be encouraged 
to grow to compensate. It is also possible to reasonably persist in doing A in the face of emerging 
negative feedback if it can be reasonably argued that more time is needed before the benefits 
begin to appear. On this view, the unacceptable side effects are outweighed by the long-term 
benefits, or are merely temporary, and the situatioŶ ͚Ŷeeds to get ǁoƌse ďefoƌe gettiŶg ďetteƌ͛. 
Finally, it is also possible to answer CQ5 in the negative and, although no ͚Plan B͛ or mitigation 
strategy are in place, still decide to go ahead with A, thereby taking the risk of an unacceptable 
outcome. In this situation, there is a rationality deficit, and deciding to do A is similar to a gamble. 
 
The critics and defenders of austerity exploited all these possibilities. Early in 2011, as austerity was 
already on its way, a fall in GDP for two consecutive quarters prompted the governmeŶt͛s ĐƌitiĐs to 
call for a ͚Plan B͛. Fƌoŵ a ĐƌitiĐal ƌatioŶalist peƌspeĐtiǀe, it is ƌatioŶal to take a Ŷegatiǀe outĐoŵe 
into account as a real possibility and prepare for it, not to have blind confidence in a positive 
outcome. The fact that the Chancellor did not seem willing to change course was taken by his critics 
as a failure of rationality. A Guardian editorial (Spending cuts, 2010) Đited OsďoƌŶe͛s ƌeplǇ to the 
Treasury select committee who had asked ͚what his back-up plaŶ aĐtuallǇ ǁas͛. He said: ͚The plaŶ is 
to haǀe ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the Bƌitish eĐoŶoŵǇ͛, pƌoŵptiŶg the editoƌ͛s comment that ͚ĐƌossiŶg oŶe͛s 
fiŶgeƌs is Ŷot a plausiďle stƌategǇ foƌ the ŵaŶ ƌuŶŶiŶg the Bƌitish eĐoŶoŵǇ͛.  The economic strategy 
was called into doubt by those who argued that the government was not sufficiently stimulating 
alternative sectors that could provide employment and growth, and was defended by those who 
argued that it was in fact creating favourable conditions for the private sector to compensate for 
public sector cuts, as well as mitigating the impact on the poor (e.g. taking more people out of 
taxation). Austerity was also defended in spite of the potential high costs, by seeing the costs as 
temporary aŶd oǀeƌƌidaďle iŶ ǀieǁ of the ďeŶefits ;͚shoƌt-term pain for long-teƌŵ gaiŶ͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg 
to The Sun).  ͚If ďitteƌ defiĐit ƌeduĐtioŶ ŵediĐiŶe ŵaǇ push eĐoŶoŵiĐallǇ ǁeak ĐouŶtƌies iŶto 
ƌeĐessioŶ, so ďe it͛, ǁƌote MaƌtiŶ Feldstein (2010) in the Financial Times, aŶd ͚a double dip is a price 
ǁoƌth paǇiŶg͛, oŶ ďalaŶĐe, if this sets the UK oŶ the path to staďle ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ. Austerity was also seen 
as a daŶgeƌous ͚gaŵďle͛ (Wolf 2010a, Stephens 2010) – a serious challenge to the rationality of 
action, in view of the stakes involved. To conclude, defenders of austerity denied that, on balance, 
the potential consequences constituted critical objections against the strategy, either because 
spending cuts were allegedly part of a coherent strategy whose other components were designed 
to compensate, or because  negative consequences could not be declared unacceptable within a 
short time frame, or because such consequences were essentially overridable in view of the goals 
and the even more serious consequences of not acting as proposed.  
A proposal for action that undermines its own stated goals is clearly unreasonable in an 
instrumental sense (if not downright irrational).  In the words of Larry Elliott (2010c) in The 
Guardian, ͚“lash aŶd ďuƌŶ is OsďoƌŶe͛s ĐuŶŶiŶg plaŶ: BlaĐkaddeƌ͛s Baldrick would be proud of the 
reasoning behind the austerity budget ... Like Baldrick, George Osborne has a cunning plan. It 
iŶǀolǀes gƌoǁiŶg the eĐoŶoŵǇ thƌough Đuts͛.  This is to say that the chosen action will not achieve 
its goal because it is in principle impossible to achieve the goal by means of such action (the means-
goal premise is false, the argument fails CQ1), or that in the process of pursuing the goal, side 
effects are generated that undermine the possibility of achieving the goal (the proposal fails CQ5). 
From a non-instrumental perspective, one that evaluates the goals themselves, an action may be 
instrumentally adequate in view of its stated goal but may be wrong (unacceptable), either because 
the stated goal itself is unacceptable (the proposal fails CQ4) or because the action has 
unacceptable unintended consequences – for example, it Đlashes ǁith otheƌ ageŶts͛ legitiŵate 
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goals, or goes against constraints on action (socially accepted values, institutional facts) which are 
arguably, on balance, non-overridable (it fails CQ5).  
 
For example, according to Vince Cable, the way in which the financial crisis was dealt with, i.e. with 
͚the ƌeĐkless aŶd iŶĐoŵpetent ... being rewarded, [and] the prudent and socially responsible 
puŶished͛, ǁas ͚a ďloǁ to the uŶdeƌlǇiŶg ǀalue sǇsteŵ, the soĐial ĐoŶtƌaĐt͛ ;Caďle ϮϬϬϵ: ϭϮϳ-128). 
Similarly, for Martin Wolf, one aspect of the failure of the Western political elites to handle the 
Đƌisis, ǁhiĐh ͚uŶdeƌŵiŶes the seŶse of faiƌŶess that uŶdeƌpiŶs the politiĐal eĐoŶoŵǇ of Đapitalisŵ͛, 
ǁas theiƌ iŶĐapaĐitǇ to pƌeǀeŶt those ͚paƌts of the elite most associated with the crisis [from 
ďeĐoŵiŶg] ƌiĐheƌ thaŶ ďefoƌe͛ ;Wolf ϮϬϭϰa: ϯϱϮͿ. The 2010 Budget was often criticized along these 
lines: making the poor pay for the crisis caused by the banks was fundamentally unjust (Milne 2010, 
Toynbee 2010), i.e. went against existing commitments and publicly recognized, legitimate values. It 
was also pointed out that the coalition government did not in fact have a democratic mandate for 
such an economic programme, i.e. there were legitimate non-overridable constraints on what the 
government was entitled or authorized to do. As such (deontic) reasons were not being taking into 
account, or were being overridden, the proposed action was arguably unreasonable (it failed CQ5).  
Rejecting a proposal on the basis of unacceptable consequences will return the arguer to the 
starting point, where an alternative line of action should be chosen. IŶ spite of the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
iŶsisteŶĐe that ͚Laďouƌ͛s legaĐǇ of ǁaste͛ ŵade austeƌitǇ uŶaǀoidaďle ;͚this is the uŶaǀoidaďle 
Budget͛, OsďoƌŶe ϮϬϭϬͿ, many arguably better means to deficit reduction were proposed from the 
start: structural economic reform, investment in green industries, a wholly new taxation system, 
including successfully pursuing tax evasion and tax avoidance (Elliott 2011). The ͚ŶeĐessaƌǇ͛ 
(unavoidable) character of austerity was thus challenged: if there are alternatives, a proposal 
cannot be ͚necessary͛. In the Financial Times, “aŵuel BƌittaŶ ;ϮϬϭϬͿ asked: ͚are these hardships 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ?͛; ͚the ƌeal aƌguŵeŶt... should ďe ǁhetheƌ ǁe Ŷeed uŶpaƌalleled fisĐal austeƌitǇ oƌ Ŷot͛. 
Similarly, Martin Wolf (2010a), calling the 2010 Budget ͚saǀage͛, noted that ͚the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt ŵust 
Ŷoǁ ǁiŶ the aƌguŵeŶt that this tighteŶiŶg ǁas esseŶtial͛. The necessary character of austerity was 
by no means self-evident to him, in light of the alternatives available, e.g. continued borrowing, or a 
ŵoƌe ͚aggƌessiǀe ŵoŶetaƌǇ eǆpaŶsioŶ͛ poliĐǇ, oŶlǇ folloǁed ďǇ ĐoŶtƌaĐtioŶ ǁheŶ gƌoǁth has 
resumed (Wolf 2010b).  
Finally, the last question (CQ6) cannot rebut the proposal but amounts to asking whether there are 
no other relevant facts about the context, which have not been taken into account, in light of which 
the conclusion does not follow (i.e. adding these facts to the premise set will invalidate or defeat 
the argument). For example, if there are facts about the context that make a proposal impossible to 
achieve, or if there are better means that have not been considered, then, however reasonable the 
proposal may be in principle, and even if it cannot be rebutted in light of its negative consequences, 
the argument in its favour will be defeated. It will not follow that the agent ought to do A, though 
neither will it follow that he ought not to do A. At this stage, critical questioning can help choose – 
from a set of reasonable alternatives that have survived criticism in light of their intended and 
unintended consequences – a proposal which is more easily feasible or preferable in the context. 
For example, without objecting to the reasonableness of austerity, Jeremy Warner asked in The 
Daily Telegraph whether it would be possible to implement it iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt:  ͚The otheƌ ŵaiŶ ƌisk is 
that the speŶdiŶg Đuts eŶǀisaged siŵplǇ ǁoŶ͛t be achievable, involving as they do a complete 
reversal of the public sector expansion that took place under the last Government. (...) Mr Osborne 
ĐaŶ talk tough, ďut ĐaŶ he eǆeĐute?͛ ;WaƌŶeƌ ϮϬϭϬa). This suggested a negative answer to CQ6. This 
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last question is designed to choose, from among reasonable and contextually feasible alternatives, 
a comparatively better alternative, oŶe that ďest ĐoƌƌespoŶds to a paƌtiĐulaƌ ageŶt͛s de facto 
overriding concerns. For example, the Chancellor defended a particular distribution of the financial 
consolidation: 80% of the savings were to come from spending cuts, while 20% from tax rises. It can 
be argued, even by defenders of austerity, that this ratio could have been different, while still being 
reasonable from the government͛s poiŶt of ǀieǁ. In the context, however, the 80:20 split was 
justified by a de facto concern for increasing BritaiŶ͛s attƌaĐtiǀeŶess foƌ ďusiŶess, which this 
particular split would presumably achieve more efficiently than others.  
How have these arguments fared since 2010? Following a return to growth in 2014, the 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt took Đƌedit foƌ haǀiŶg set the ĐouŶtƌǇ oŶ the ƌoad to ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ, aŶd BƌitaiŶ͛s ƌeĐessioŶ 
was officially declared over in July 2014. Together with a record fall in unemployment (under 2 
million, i.e. pre-Đƌisis leǀels, iŶ OĐtoďeƌ ϮϬϭϰͿ, the ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ seeŵed to ƌefute the ĐƌitiĐs͛ oďjeĐtioŶs 
aŶd pƌoǀide ĐoŶĐlusiǀe eǀideŶĐe that the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s plaŶ ǁas ǁoƌkiŶg.  Hoǁeǀeƌ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to 
soŵe ĐƌitiĐs the ͚ǁƌoŶg kiŶd of ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ is currently takiŶg plaĐe, aŶ ͚uŶďalaŶĐed͛ oŶe, doŵiŶated 
by the service industries (including the financial sector), by consumer spending and the housing 
market, not by manufacturing (Vince Cable, cited in Wintour et al 2014).  Moreover, the return to 
growth is Ŷot ďeiŶg tƌaŶslated iŶto iŶĐƌeases iŶ ǁages: a ͚joďs-rich but pay-pooƌ ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛, 
according to a Bank of England chief economist, where many jobs are only part-tiŵe, oŶ ͚zeƌo-hour 
ĐoŶtƌaĐts͛, oƌ pooƌlǇ paid. Although the Budget defiĐit deĐƌeased ďetǁeen 2010-2012, it is still high, 
ǁhile the UK ŶatioŶal deďt has gƌoǁŶ eǀeƌǇ Ǉeaƌ, thus ĐleaƌlǇ defeatiŶg the Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe͛s 
;ϮϬϭϬͿ taƌgets of haǀiŶg  ͚a ďalaŶĐed ďudget aŶd falliŶg ŶatioŶal deďt ďǇ the eŶd of this PaƌliaŵeŶt͛, 
i.e. 2015. The argument has also been made (by Elliott 2015 and others) that the Chancellor in fact 
abandoned his original Plan A sometime in 2012 and reverted to the plans inherited from the 
Labour Chancellor, Alistair Darling, hence the incipient recovery.  
For political scientist Maƌk BlǇth ;ϮϬϭϯͿ, ͚austeƌitǇ doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk͛. Theƌe aƌe Ŷo geŶuiŶe Đases of 
expansionary fiscal contraction in periods of economic slump, and austerity will always make the 
debt bigger, not smaller, as historical evidence shows. In his view, there was nothing inevitable 
about austerity, there were alternatives. One, preferable in retrospect, would have been not to bail 
out the banks. A solution now would be a renewed effort to collect taxes on a global scale – taxing 
the rich and the banks, the beneficiaries of the bailout (Blyth 2013: 229-244). 
 
4. Framing austerity: negative consequences as salient premises 
In this section I will draw selectively on work in progress on the corpus, focusing on just a few 
keywords and their associated semantic fields.8 My primary purpose is to suggest an argumentative 
ĐoŶĐeptioŶ of ͚fƌaŵiŶg͛ and illustrate how analysis of framing can be integrated with the analysis 
and evaluation of argumentation. 
The ĐoŶĐept of ͚fƌaŵiŶg͛ is ǁidelǇ used iŶ politiĐal ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ aŶd ŵedia studies, as ǁell as iŶ 
cognitive linguistics, psychology, sociology and anthropology. There is little consensus on how to 
defiŶe aŶd opeƌatioŶalize ͚fƌaŵes͛ ;EŶtŵaŶ ϭϵϵϯ, ‘eese et al ϮϬϬϳ, D͛AŶgelo & KuǇpeƌs ϮϬϭϬͿ, Ǉet 
there is some consensus that exposure to alternative arguments in public deliberation can weaken 
͚fƌaŵiŶg effeĐts͛, the ĐogŶitiǀe oƌ deĐisioŶ ďias iŶduĐed ďǇ alteƌŶatiǀe ǁaǇs of ͚framing͛ an issue 
(Sniderman & Theriault 2004).  
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In another paper, I have proposed an argumentative definition of framing that is compatible with 
EŶtŵaŶ͛s ;ϭϵϵϯͿ ĐlassiĐ defiŶitioŶ of fƌaŵiŶg iŶ teƌŵs of ͚seleĐtioŶ aŶd salieŶĐe͛9. Not all framing 
occurs within deliberative, decision-making processes (there is, for example, narrative framing, 
underlain by a different genre). When decision-making is involved, however, framing can be viewed 
as the selective salience given to certain premises in a deliberative process, intended to direct an 
audience towards a particular conclusion (and potentially towards a particular decision and course 
of action). Any practical reasoning premise (goals, values, consequences, circumstances, means-
goals relations) can be made selectively more salient in the attempt to direct the audience towards 
a preferred conclusion. The practical claim (proposal) itself can be made more salient by redefining 
it in a way that suggests it either should or should not be adopted.  In this process, metaphors, 
analogies and ͚persuasive definitions͛ ;i.e. ƌhetoƌiĐallǇ ďiased defiŶitioŶs, WaltoŶ ϮϬϬϳaͿ may be 
used to redefine facts in rhetorically convenient ways and thus lend support either to the practical 
claim that A should be performed or that it should not.  
 
The way in which the fiŶaŶĐial Đƌisis ǁas ͚fƌaŵed͛, foƌ eǆaŵple, as a Đƌisis of oǀeƌspeŶdiŶg ;ďǇ 
making salient the alleged explanation for the circumstances) supported a particular solution: 
speŶdiŶg Đuts. “iŵilaƌlǇ, the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ ďetǁeeŶ the UK eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd that of a 
household (making salient a particular definition of the circumstances of action) argued in favour of 
clearing debts as solution. Successful challenges of such definitions, metaphors and analogies can 
defeat the arguments in which they function as premises. National economies, for example, are not 
really similar to households. For a family or individual business it makes sense to cut costs, but if 
national economies try to cut costs, this will shrink demand and damage growth. In other words, 
͚aŶ iŶdiǀidual ŵaǇ Ŷot speŶd all his iŶĐoŵe. But the ǁoƌld ŵust do so͛ ;Wolf ϮϬϬϴͿ. 
 
While the primary mechanism of framing, on this account, involves making a particular premise 
more salient and potentially overriding, a second, additional mechanism seems to be at work 
whenever framing involves metaphors (X is Y), analogies (X is like Y) or persuasive definitions (X is a 
kind of Y). In such cases, two frames, corresponding to the target and source domains, are mapped 
onto one another, so that the entailments of the source domain can be used to reason about the 
target domain (Fairclough & MădƌoaŶe foƌthĐoŵiŶgͿ. This seĐtioŶ illustƌates the fiƌst ŵeĐhaŶisŵ, 
the next one illustrates the second. 10 
One way of making the negative consequences salient in the austerity debate was in (non-
ŵetaphoƌiĐalͿ teƌŵs of ͚ƌisk͛ ;a total of 217 relevant occurrences) (Table 2Ϳ.  The ͚ƌisks͛ of a ͚douďle-
dip ƌeĐessioŶ͛ ;ϱϴ occurrencesͿ, of ͚ĐhokiŶg off the ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ ;ϳͿ oƌ of ͚stagŶatioŶ͛ ;ϵͿ aƌe poteŶtial 
consequences that need to be averted and result from various probability judgments based on 
known facts. For the defenders of austerity, failing to deal with the deficit is the main source of risk: 
Britain may lose fiscal credibility, which can lead to a downgrade in credit rating, hence to spiralling 
borrowing costs, a fall in investor confidence, and so oŶ. AusteƌitǇ ǁill aĐtuallǇ ƌeduĐe ƌisk: ͚the 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ gaŵďle is ŵuĐh eǆaggeƌated͛, ͚the Đuts aƌeŶ͛t that deep͛ aŶd theiƌ effeĐt is to ƌeduĐe the 
͚possiďilitǇ [of a fisĐal Đƌisis] fƌoŵ pƌoďaďle to ŵost uŶlikelǇ͛ ;WaƌŶeƌ ϮϬϭϬď, Daily Telegraph). For 
the critics, the austerity agenda itself is the source of risk. In particular, high risk arises from 
pƌoposed aĐtioŶ that is Ŷot aĐĐoŵpaŶied ďǇ a ͚PlaŶ B͛ aŶd seeŵs iŵŵuŶe to falsifiĐatioŶ iŶ light of 
available knowledge (knowledge about past crises, economic theory) which should be used to test 
its ƌeasoŶaďleŶess. Theƌe aƌe ϭϱ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes of ͚PlaŶ B͛ iŶ the Đoƌpus, e.g. ͚What͛s the plaŶ B if the 
cunning plan goes wrong? The answer is simple: there is no plan B because the Treasury believes 
13 
 
the need for one will not aƌise͛ ;The Guardian).  For some critics, this makes the risks unacceptable 
;͚Oǀeƌzealous Đuts ƌisk a douďle-dip ƌeĐessioŶ aŶd ǁill fall dispƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ oŶ the sŵall people͛, 
Financial Times); for others, the risks are outweighed by the fact that any alternative would be 
ǁoƌse ;͚Theƌe is a peƌfeĐtlǇ ƌeasoŶaďle justifiĐatioŶ foƌ takiŶg this soƌt of ƌisk: the alteƌŶatiǀe – a 
failing to tackle the deficit – is eǀeŶ ŵoƌe daŶgeƌous͛, The Daily Telegraph).  
  
Newspaper Risk* Examples 
   
The Guardian 72 ͚Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe͛s austeƌitǇ ďudget has iŶĐƌeased the ƌisk of 
BƌitaiŶ slidiŶg ďaĐk iŶto ƌeĐessioŶ͛; ͚the ƌisk is Ǉou deƌail the 
recovery and that means your borrowing in the longer term 
ǁill ďe higheƌ͛   
The  Daily 
Telegraph 
40  ͚The Liďeƌal DeŵoĐƌats Ŷoǁ agƌee ǁith the CoŶseƌǀatiǀes 
that the ďalaŶĐe of ƌisk faǀouƌs eaƌlǇ aĐtioŶ͛; ͚BƌitaiŶ 
ƌeŵaiŶs at ƌisk of a ƌatiŶg doǁŶgƌade͛; ͚this Budget ƌisks 
teaƌiŶg soĐietǇ apaƌt͛  
The Daily Mail 30 ͚BƌitaiŶ is so faƌ iŶto the ƌed that ǁe ƌisk losing the 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe of the fiŶaŶĐial ŵaƌkets͛; ͚the sĐale of the 
ďudget defiĐit ƌisks ĐausiŶg a ŵajoƌ Đƌisis iŶ ouƌ eĐoŶoŵǇ͛; 
͚OsďoƌŶe is ƌiskiŶg a douďle-dip ƌeĐessioŶ͛  
Financial Times 70 ͚Theƌe is a ƌisk that sǇŶĐhƌoŶised fisĐal adjustŵeŶt aĐƌoss 
several major economies could adversely impact the 
ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛; ͚FisĐal ĐoŶsolidatioŶ ǁill ďƌiŶg ǁith it the ƌisk of a 
temporary decline in economic activity and a rise in 
uŶeŵploǇŵeŶt͛; ͚the ƌisk of a seĐoŶd Gƌeat DepƌessioŶ͛  
The Sun 5 ͚[Laďouƌ ǁaƌŶed that the Budget] ǁould put ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ at ƌisk͛ 
 
 
Table 2. Negatiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes as ͚ƌisks͛ 
 
Besides emphasizing negative consequences as serious risks, usually seen as critical objections 
against the proposed action, a variety of metaphors were used to strengthen the case for or against 
austerity, by lending support to the claim that the consequences were, on balance,  acceptable or 
not. I will now turn to a few cases of such metaphorical framing. 11 
 
5. The argumentative function of metaphors in framing the austerity debate 
 
AusteƌitǇ as poliĐǇ pƌoposal ǁas ͚fƌaŵed͛ iŶ ǀaƌious ǁaǇs. A paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ stƌikiŶg defiŶitioŶ ǁas that 
of the JuŶe ϮϬϭϬ Budget as a ͚gaŵďle͛ ;ϰϯ ƌeleǀaŶt oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes iŶ the ĐoƌpusͿ.  AĐĐoƌdiŶg to The 
Guardian, OsďoƌŶe͛s Budget ǁas ͚iŶ ƌealitǇ ... the ďudget of a gaŵďleƌ͛, ͚a gaŵďle oŶ a ŵoŶuŵeŶtal 
sĐale͛, ͚a gaŵďle ǁith the liǀelihoods aŶd liǀiŶg staŶdaƌds of ŵillioŶs of people͛ ;Ϯϭ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes). 
‘eadeƌs ǁeƌe told that ͚OsďoƌŶe has gaŵďled that eaƌlǇ toughŶess ǁill Ǉield lateƌ peaĐe͛ aŶd ͚if 
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OsďoƌŶe͛s gaŵďle paǇs off, it is ThatĐheƌisŵ͛s fiŶest houƌ͛. IŶ additioŶ, the poliĐǇ ǁas desĐƌiďed as 
͚defiĐit-slashiŶg supeƌstitioŶ͛ aŶd ͚defiĐit fetishisŵ͛, suggesting a deficit of rationality and irrational 
risk-taking and lending argumentative support to the conclusion that austerity is not the right 
policy. According to the Financial Times, ͚this gaŵďle has Ŷoǁ defiŶed the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt. If it is seeŶ 
to have failed, it ǁill ďe fiŶished͛.  ;͚Gaŵďle͛ oĐĐuƌs ϭϬ, ϰ, ϲ aŶd Ϯ tiŵes iŶ the Financial Times, Daily 
Telegraph, Daily Mail and Sun, ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ.Ϳ The Budget ǁas also said to ďe a ͚ďet͛ ;ϵ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes 
iŶ the ĐoƌpusͿ:  ͚Mƌ OsďoƌŶe is takiŶg a ďig ďet that the economy will come right through market 
foƌĐes ... aŶd he does Ŷot haǀe a safetǇ Ŷet iŶ Đase his ďet souƌs͛; ͚all is ďet oŶ the heƌoiĐ 
assuŵptioŶ that the eĐoŶoŵǇ Đoŵes good, gƌoǁth is ŵiƌaĐulouslǇ ƋuiĐk aŶd the paiŶ ǁas ǁoƌth it͛.  
If austerity is a gamble, then by entailment12 it involves unjustifiable, even irrational risk. This feeds 
into an argument against austerity: because austerity is similar to a gamble, the potential 
consequences are unacceptable and the proposal fails to survive CQ5 (the outcome could be 
disastrous and there is no way of mitigating or redressing it).  
IŶ additioŶ to ŵetaphoƌs suggestiŶg eǆtƌeŵe ƌeĐkless oƌ iƌƌatioŶal ďehaǀiouƌ ;͚gaŵďliŶg͛, ďut also 
͚luŶaĐǇ͛: ͚the luŶatiĐs aƌe ďaĐk iŶ Đhaƌge of the eĐoŶoŵǇ aŶd theǇ ǁaŶt Đuts, Đuts, Đuts͛, Elliott 
2010a), metaphors suggesting extreme violence towards the population seem to predominate in 
fƌaŵiŶg austeƌitǇ poliĐies. Foƌ eǆaŵple, theƌe aƌe oǀeƌ ϴϯ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes of ͚aǆe͛ iŶ the Đoƌpus: ͚aǆiŶg 
speŶdiŶg͛, ͚ǁheƌe the aǆe ǁill fall͛, a ͚ƌepeat of the heaƌtless aǆe-ǁieldiŶg of the ThatĐheƌ Ǉeaƌs͛, 
͚soŵe Liď Deŵ Ǉellow ribbons decorated the handle of the axe, but they barely impeded the swing 
of the eǆeĐutioŶeƌ͛s aƌŵ͛, ͚the aǆe-ŵaŶ͛ [i.e. OsďoƌŶe]. The Budget is also desĐƌiďed as aŶ ͚assault͛ 
;͚the ďiggest sustaiŶed assault oŶ the puďliĐ seĐtoƌ siŶĐe the ǁaƌ͛Ϳ, aŶ ͚attaĐk͛ ;͚attaĐks oŶ puďliĐ 
seƌǀiĐes, paǇ aŶd peŶsioŶs͛Ϳ, a ͚ǁaƌ͛ ;͚aŶ ideologiĐal war agaiŶst the puďliĐ seĐtoƌ͛Ϳ, a ͚slash-and-
ďuƌŶ͛ appƌoaĐh. IŶ the Financial Times, MaƌtiŶ Wolf ;ϮϬϭϬaͿ uses ͚ďloodďath͛ as a ŵetaphoƌ foƌ the 
Budget ;͚this ǁas a ďloodďath ŶoŶe ǁas pƌepaƌed foƌ͛Ϳ; theƌe aƌe ϭϰ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes of ͚ďloodďath͛ iŶ 
total.   
Otheƌ ŵetaphoƌs suppoƌt the opposite ĐoŶĐlusioŶ. FƌaŵiŶg the Budget as ͚suƌgeƌǇ͛ ;The Daily 
Telegraph: ͚paiŶful suƌgeƌǇ͛, ͚the suƌgeoŶ-ChaŶĐelloƌ ǁas geŶtleƌ thaŶ ŵaŶǇ eǆpeĐted͛Ϳ suggests 
that it ǁill ƌestoƌe BƌitaiŶ͛s eĐoŶoŵǇ to health ;ǁill haǀe positiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐesͿ, aŶd theƌefoƌe 
austerity is, on balance, the right policy. Surprisingly, defining austerity as a bloodbath sometimes 
supports the same conclusion in favour of austeƌitǇ. IŶ aŶ aƌtiĐle eŶtitled ͚BƌitoŶs BaĐk Tough 
Geoƌge͛, The Sun Đlaiŵed that ͚Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe͛s ďloodďath Budget is a shoĐk hit ǁith ǀoteƌs͛. This 
reflects a particular way of weighing reasons, in which the impact of austerity is outweighed by its 
alleged benefits. 
FramiŶg austeƌitǇ as a ͚gaŵďle͛ ;oƌ as ͚suƌgeƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚eǆeĐutioŶ͛Ϳ achieves two things: 1) it maps two 
frames onto one another, i.e. the POLICY frame is mapped onto the GAMBLE frame, and the 
entailments of the latter are then used to reason about the former; (2) it gives prominence to a 
particular premise within the deliberation scheme (in this case, a premise within the argument from 
negative consequence) so as to direct the audience towards a particular conclusion. If austerity is 
adopted, then the consequences (i.e. very high risks) will be unacceptable, because the policy is 
similar to a gamble; therefore (unless these potential consequences can be overridden) it follows 
that the policy should not be adopted.13  
Figure 2 suggests where such metaphors or definitions are embedded in the overall argument 
;͚austeƌitǇ as a gaŵďle͛ oƌ ͚ďloodďath͛ in the argument from negative consequence on the left, and 
͚austeƌitǇ as suƌgeƌǇ͛ iŶ the aƌguŵeŶt fƌoŵ positiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe oŶ the ƌightͿ. 
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Figure 2. The argumentative function of metaphors, analogies and persuasive definitions 
The consequences of austerity are also frequently expressed in metaphorical teƌŵs of ͚paiŶ͛ ;Table 
3), part of the wider framing of austerity in terms of metaphors of violence. The Guardian speaks 
aďout ͚the uŶjust distƌiďutioŶ of paiŶ͛, generally questioning the Đlaiŵ that ͚the ƌiĐh ǁill feel ŵoƌe 
paiŶ thaŶ the pooƌ͛ oƌ that ͚the paiŶ ǁould ďe ďoƌŶe eƋuallǇ͛ aŶd ǁaƌŶing that that ͚the paiŶ ǁill 
fall on the pooƌest people iŶ the pooƌest ƌegioŶs͛.  The Daily Mail aƌgued that ͚Without paiŶ, theƌe 
ǁill ďe Ŷo ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛ aŶd the ͚Budget paiŶ ĐaŶ ŵake BƌitaiŶ stƌoŶgeƌ͛ ;headliŶesͿ, that the ͚paiŶful 
Budget͛ ǁas ͚uŶaǀoidaďle if BƌitaiŶ is to pƌeǀeŶt the ŵoŶeǇ ŵarkets imposing a Greek-style crisis on 
this ĐouŶtƌǇ͛.  This suggests that the poteŶtial Ŷegatiǀe ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes haǀe ďeeŶ ǁeighed agaiŶst 
other reasons in favour and have been overridden: pain is necessary and unavoidable if the goals 
are to be achieved and even more serious consequences are to be avoided. Similarly, The Daily 
Telegraph Đlaiŵed that ͚soŵe paiŶ todaǇ ǁould aǀoid ŵoƌe paiŶ toŵoƌƌoǁ͛ aŶd ͚to ďe ƌadiĐal, iŶ 
the current situation, means to perform painful but life-saving surgery on the British ecoŶoŵǇ͛, i.e. 
alteƌŶatiǀes to ͚paiŶ͛ aƌe ǁoƌse ;͚paiŶ͛ is oǀeƌƌiddeŶ oƌ outǁeighedͿ.  
 
Newspaper Pain* Examples 
   
The Guardian 47 ͚PaiŶ Ŷoǁ, ŵoƌe paiŶ lateƌ͛; the ͚deďataďle Đlaiŵ͛ that ͚the 
ƌiĐh ǁill feel ŵoƌe paiŶ thaŶ the pooƌ͛; ͚the uŶjust 
distƌiďutioŶ of paiŶ͛; , ͚uŶŶeĐessaƌǇ paiŶ͛, ͚seǀeƌe paiŶ͛, 
͚paiŶful speŶdiŶg Đuts͛ 
The  Daily 
Telegraph 
28 The ChaŶĐelloƌ ͚deliǀeƌed the ďad Ŷeǁs aďout paiŶful 
suƌgeƌǇ͛; ͚eǀeƌǇoŶe had to shaƌe the paiŶ to ƌepaiƌ the 
ƌuiŶs of the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛; ͚the paiŶ has ďeen spread 
pƌopoƌtioŶatelǇ͛ 
The Daily Mail 44  ͚paiŶful puďliĐ speŶdiŶg Đuts͛; ͚a PaƌliaŵeŶt of paiŶ͛;  
͚ŵakiŶg suƌe that the paiŶ ǁill ďe eǀeŶlǇ shaƌed ďetǁeeŶ 
ƌiĐh aŶd pooƌ͛; ͚ease the paiŶ of a ďloodďath paĐkage͛ 
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Financial Times 35 ͚Mƌ OsďoƌŶe believes the fiscal pain now will pave the way 
foƌ ƌeĐoǀeƌǇ͛; ͚foƌ all that the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt Đlaiŵs it ǁaŶts 
the pain to be evenly spread, the less well-off and the 
pooƌest ƌegioŶs ǁill suffeƌ ŵost͛; ͚a paiŶful Budget͛ 
The Sun 35 ͚Woƌth the PaiŶ͛; ͚PaiŶ today rather than more pain 
toŵoƌƌoǁ͛; ͚BƌitaiŶ ďƌaĐes itself foƌ fiǀe Ǉeaƌs of paiŶ͛; 
͚Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe ǀoǁed to ease the paiŶ of Đuts͛; ͚his 
painful national belt-tighteŶiŶg ǁas ƌight͛; ͚paiŶful ďut 
uŶaǀoidaďle joď losses͛ 
 
Table 3. Negative consequences as ͚pain͛ 
To a much greater extent than the other newspapers, The Sun viewed pain as a necessary 
consequence, and one that was overridden by other reasons. As the headliŶe: ͚Woƌth the PaiŶ. 
Tough measures get thumbs-up͛ suggested, the benefits of austerity weƌe ǁoƌth the suffeƌiŶg. ͚If, 
out of the ashes of Labour, Mr Osborne creates a self-reliant nation freed from the shackles of 
ďeŶefit addiĐtioŶ, he ǁill haǀe eŶsuƌed ǇesteƌdaǇ͛s paiŶ ǁas Ŷot iŶ ǀaiŶ͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶg to The Sun, the 
Budget ͚has to huƌt͛, aŶd it ͚has to ďe so tough it ďƌiŶgs teaƌs to ouƌ eǇes͛.  Thus, a late-June Yougov 
poll allegedly showed that Britons gaǀe the ChaŶĐelloƌ a ͚ǀote of ĐoŶfideŶĐe͛ aŶd iŶdiĐated ͚stƌoŶg 
suppoƌt foƌ ŵaŶǇ of the otheƌ paiŶ doses͛, paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ the Đap oŶ housiŶg ďeŶefits (with 70% in 
favour). IŶ additioŶ, austeƌitǇ͛s effects on the poor had allegedly been carefully mitigated: ͚the paiŶ 
has been spread fairly, with the better-off hit haƌd ǁhile those at the ďottoŵ aƌe pƌoteĐted͛; ͚like a 
dentist with a pain-killing injection, Mr Osborne will ease the misery by taking nearly a million low 
paid ǁoƌkeƌs out of iŶĐoŵe taǆ altogetheƌ͛. AusteƌitǇ ĐaŶŶot theƌefoƌe ďe faulted aŶd suĐĐessfullǇ 
survives critical questioning in light of its consequences (withstands both CQ4 and CQ5).   
The ǁaǇ iŶ ǁhiĐh the ͚paiŶ͛ ŵetaphoƌ is used iŶ the ϱ Ŷeǁspapeƌs is appaƌeŶtlǇ siŵilaƌ ;siŵilaƌ 
ĐolloĐatioŶs: ͚spƌead the paiŶ͛, ͚iŶfliĐt paiŶ͛, ͚ease the paiŶ͛, ͚shaƌe the paiŶ͛Ϳ ďut, fƌoŵ aŶ 
argumentative perspective, very different. Almost without exception, The Guardian talks about 
͚paiŶ͛ as aŶ uŶaĐĐeptaďle ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe that ought Ŷot to ďe oǀeƌƌiddeŶ ďǇ otheƌ ƌeasoŶs ;i.e. the 
goal does not justify the means). At the other end of the spectrum, again almost without exception, 
The Sun predominantly views pain as fundamentally overridable concern, in light of the greater 
benefits to be obtained and of the efforts being made to mitigate or ͚ease the ďuƌdeŶ͛ oŶ the 
population. Two fundamentally different arguments are being made in these articles. One is an 
attempt to conclusively reject austerity, on the grounds of failing CQ5, admitting it has survived 
CQ4. The other supports it, for allegedly answering both CQ4 and CQ5 in a satisfactory manner: the 
negative consequences do not, on balance, constitute critical objections, in light of mitigation 
strategies in place and because they are outweighed by greater benefits.  
To conclude, negative consequences (as premises) were made more salient (and thus presumably 
expected to direct the audience towards a particular view of austerity) either with or without the 
help of underlying metaphors, analogies or persuasive definitions. In both cases, the framing 
process was accompanied by a weighing of reasons (the essence of deliberation). In some cases, 
the negative consequences were deemed to be on balance unacceptable, thus indicating that 
austerity was not a reasonable policy and ought to be abandoned; in others, they were allegedly 
overridden or outweighed by other premises and did not succeed in rebutting the conclusion. 
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Rhetorically powerful metaphors (austerity as ͚gamble͛ or ͚bloodbath͛) were used by the critics of 
austerity to persuade audiences that the consequences should on balance be viewed as 
unacceptable, that they cannot overridden by any other reasons (i.e. they are critical objections), 
and thus to direct the audience towards rejecting austerity. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I have illustrated the way in which the austerity policies initiated by the UK government in 2010 
were evaluated in a range of newspapers in the two months that followed the 2010 Emergency 
Budget. In proposing a deliberation scheme and set of critical questions, I have tried to offer a 
means of analyzing and evaluating any deliberative activity type that ends in a practical proposal for 
action. My main purpose was to offer a framework for analysis and evaluation, usable primarily by 
policy and discourse analysts, but also potentially by policy-makers, political activists, journalists 
and other actors in the political field. I have also shown how ͚framiŶg͛, ǁhiĐh is oŶlǇ ǀaguelǇ, if at 
all, related to analysis of argumentation in the literature, is best seen as contributing premises in a 
deliberative and decision-making process and thus shaping the inferential process towards a 
particular conclusion.  
 
I have drawn (admittedly, to a limited extent) on Corpus Linguistics methods in order to analyze 
concordance lines and keywords, but I have done so primarily in order to facilitate analysis of 
argumentation. I have placed keywords within argument schemes, in the premises and conclusions 
of arguments. The analysis has shown not only that there is no straightforward correspondence 
between the concept of consequence and its linguistic realizations, but that one needs to have a 
concept of consequence first, as a premise in an argument scheme, and an understanding of what 
the public debate is about, in order to start looking for the linguistic realization of this premise with 
the help of computer software. It has also shown that the same reasons (premises) are weighed 
differently by different arguers, leading to different conclusions. Generalizations about the way 
different newspapers position themselves in relation to austerity are thus impossible to make on 
the basis of judgments of keyness alone: the arguments themselves must be carefully unpacked.  
 
The austerity agenda has been criticized by economists, political scientists and NGOs (NEF, 
Compass, Tax Research UK, etc.). However, apart from the Occupy movement and a number of 
other protests and strikes, austerity has not been challenged significantly by the broad UK public. 
This may be due in part to the way in which, in framing the crisis as one of state overspending, the 
government has successfully enlisted common sense on its side: a common sense view of the 
eĐoŶoŵǇ ;a ͚household͛ that ŵust paǇ off its deďts aŶd ͚liǀe ǁithiŶ its ŵeaŶs͛Ϳ, of aĐĐeptaďle 
solutioŶs ;͚Ŷo paiŶ, Ŷo gaiŶ͛, ͚Ǉou ĐaŶŶot Đuƌe deďt ǁith ŵoƌe deďt͛Ϳ aŶd of faiƌŶess ;it is Ŷot faiƌ 
that working people should support people who choose to live on benefits). It has also been 
suggested that, by activatiŶg a ͚logiĐ of ƌeseŶtŵeŶt͛, aŶd ͚dƌaǁiŶg a liŶe of aŶtagoŶisŵ͛ ďetǁeeŶ 
͚haƌd-ǁoƌkiŶg͛ people aŶd ͚sĐƌouŶgeƌs͛ oƌ ͚skiǀeƌs͛, the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt has ŵaŶaged to Đƌeate a ďƌoad 
acceptance of the austerity agenda by the population, in spite of its harsh impact (Seymour 2017: 
158). Possibly, another cause is the failure of the main parliamentary opposition, Labour, to 
develop a real alternative to austerity.  
 
All of the arguments for and against austerity that are being heard at the end of 2014 were already 
present in the public debate on austerity that took place in the summer of 2010. Neither the 
supporters nor the critics of austerity seem at the moment willing to withdraw their original 
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arguments in the face of emerging evidence, which continues to be interpreted in ways that 
support their original standpoints. For the Chancellor, a return to growth and high employment 
figuƌes iŶdiĐate that austeƌitǇ is ǁoƌkiŶg. Foƌ his oppoŶeŶts, austeƌitǇ͛s clear failure to reduce the 
debt and the weakness of the recovery indicate it ought to be abandoned.  Not only have the 
intended goals not been achieved (instead, what high-income countries are now experiencing is a 
͚tƌulǇ eǆtƌaoƌdiŶaƌǇ state of ŵaŶaged depƌessioŶ͛, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Wolf ϮϬϭϰb), but the impact on 
other legitimate goals (living standards, in the UK and throughout Europe) has been severe, hence 
some alternative arguably has to be found. It may be that, as Blyth (2013: 244) argues (in defending 
taxation as a reasonable solution), austerity will be abandoned eventually, though ͚Ŷot ďeĐause [it] 
is uŶfaiƌ, ǁhiĐh it is͛, ďut pƌiŵaƌilǇ ďeĐause, fƌoŵ a puƌelǇ iŶstƌuŵeŶtal peƌspeĐtiǀe, ͚austerity 
siŵplǇ does Ŷot ǁoƌk͛.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1 This paper started as a keynote at a conference entitled The Discourse of Austerity: Critical analyses of 
business and economics across disciplines, hosted by Newcastle University in September 2013. I am grateful 
to the conference organizers and participants, particularly to Darren Kelsey and Majid KhosraviNik, as well as 
to David Miller, Norman Fairclough, Sheryl Prentice and two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments 
and suggestions. 
2 These were selected with the help of LexisNexis database (except for the Financial TimesͿ, usiŶg ͚Budget͛ 
aŶd ͚OsďoƌŶe͛ oƌ ͚Đut*͛ as seaƌĐh teƌŵs, fƌoŵ a total of ϵϳϯ aƌtiĐles ;iŶ all UK ŶatioŶal ŶeǁspapeƌsͿ. This 
corpus was then restricted to four national newspapers (461 articles). The Financial Times corpus was 
compiled separately, using two separate searches in the FT aƌĐhiǀe, oŶe aŵoŶgst ͚aƌtiĐles͛, usiŶg the pƌe-
defiŶed seaƌĐh teƌŵs ͚UŶited KiŶgdoŵ͛, ͚Geoƌge OsďoƌŶe͛ aŶd the ƌeleǀaŶt tiŵe peƌiod, aŶd aŶotheƌ oŶe  
ǁith ͚Đut*͛ aŶd ͚austeƌitǇ͛, to seleĐt otheƌ pieĐes ǁhiĐh ǁeƌe Ŷot Đlassified as ͚aƌtiĐles͛, e.g. the JulǇ ϮϬϭϬ 
͚AusteƌitǇ Deďate͛. These tǁo seaƌĐhes Ǉielded a total of ϵϮ aƌtiĐles ďetǁeeŶ the saŵe dates. The aŶalǇsis 
was assisted by Antconc, a Corpus Linguistics software (Anthony 2014). 
 
3 Argument schemes are basic patterns of human reasoning, empirically-derived inferential structures that 
underlie everyday argumentation. Their structure creates possibilities for critical questioning, in the form of 
finite sets of critical questions attached to each scheme. These may be actually asked by participants in 
everyday argumentation or they may not. It is the task of the analyst to bring the normative template of the 
deliberation scheme to bear on the systematic evaluation of public debate, by asking all the relevant 
questions that the template makes possible (normative critique), as well as inquiring into why some of these 
questions are either not asked or answered in a satisfactory manner, if that is the case (explanatory critique). 
For the distinction between normative and explanatory critique, see the Introduction to Fairclough 2014. 
 
4 There does not seem to be a way of ordering CQ1-CQ3 among themselves; however, CQ4-CQ6 do enable a 
progressive narrowing down of alternatives. 
5 According to Blyth, the ͚oppoƌtuŶistiĐ ƌeďƌaŶdiŶg͛ of private-sector debt as public debt and the attribution 
of its Đauses to eǆĐessiǀe puďliĐ speŶdiŶg ǁas ͚the gƌeatest ďait aŶd sǁitĐh iŶ ŵodeƌŶ histoƌǇ͛. The ĐoƌƌeĐt 
eǆplaŶatioŶ ǁas this: ͚BailiŶg led to deďts. Deďt led to Đƌisis. Cƌisis led to austeƌitǇ͛ ;Blyth 2013: 73, 231). 
6 *Fair* (fair, fairness, unfair, etc.) is one of the main keywords; there are 99 relevant occurrences of *fair* in 
The Guardian, 59 in The Daily Telegraph, 31 in The Daily Mail, 31 in the Financial Times and 29 in The Sun. 
͚Pƌogƌessiǀe͛ ;ϲϴ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐesͿ aŶd ͚ƌegƌessiǀe͛ ;ϯϮ oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐesͿ aƌe used siŵilaƌlǇ.  
 
7 A concern for fairness is an internal reason, a motive for action. A commitment to fairness, creating an 
obligation to be fair, is an external reason (part of the circumstances of action, as an institutional constraint) 
that ought to motivate agents, although it does not always do so.  External reasons may be internalized, 
turned into motives or not, but agents continue to have them as reasons, even when they do not act on 
them (obligations do not disappear just because we choose to ignore them) (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012: 
69-73, see Searle 2010). 
 
8 The lexical items I am looking at (*fair*, pain*, risk*, hit*, ax*, gambl* and bloodbath) all occur with the 
first 500 keywords of the corpus (out of 8777) and have very high keyness values.  Judgements of keyness 
initially emerged from reading a smaller version of the corpus (250 texts, 50 for each newspaper) in its 
entirety; these initial impressions were then tested by comparing the keyword list with the Brown corpus 
keyword list, available on the Antconc website, which was used as reference. 
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9 ͚To fƌaŵe is to seleĐt soŵe aspeĐts of a peƌĐeiǀed ƌealitǇ aŶd ŵake theŵ ŵoƌe salieŶt iŶ a ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatiŶg 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation foƌ the iteŵ desĐƌiďed͛ ;EŶtŵaŶ ϭϵϵϯ: ϱϮͿ. 
 
10 I am proposing a new view of the framing process, not of frames. Regarding frames, I take the Fillmorian 
view that they are systems of related concepts – e.g. the RISK frame (Fillmore & Atkins 1992), involving an 
agent, a proposed action, potential harm, intended gains, etc. The argumentative scheme for deliberation 
can be used to define a DECISION-MAKING frame in Fillmorian terms, involving an agent proposing a course 
of action amongst possible alternatives, in view of certain goals and values, with potential consequences.  
 
11 In the corpus, negative consequences are expressed in both metaphorical and non-metaphorical terms, 
e.g. ďǇ ǀeƌďs like ͚suffeƌ͛ oƌ ͚hit͛ aŶd ŶouŶs like ͚iŵpaĐt͛, ͚effeĐt͛, ͚ĐoŶseƋueŶĐe͛, ͚ďuƌdeŶ͛. Theƌe aƌe ϮϵϬ 
ƌeleǀaŶt oĐĐuƌƌeŶĐes of ͚hit*͛ ;͚[The Budget ǁill] hit the pooƌest haƌdest, ǁhile ďaƌelǇ iŶĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐiŶg the 
ƌiĐh͛Ϳ aŶd ϲϴ of ͚suffeƌ͛ ;͚the pooƌ ǁill suffeƌ the ŵost fƌoŵ the ďudget͛Ϳ.   
 
12 Entailment is a logical relation between sentences, where the truth of one requires the truth of the other: 
if something is a gamble, then it is risky.  
13 It is possible to see such arguments from analogy or definition as directly supporting the practical claim via 
their entailments. However, I am representing them as subordinated to the arguments from positive or 
negative consequence because this shows more clearly that: (a) it is in virtue of the known effects of 
͚gaŵďliŶg͛, ͚eǆeĐutioŶ͛ oƌ ͚suƌgeƌǇ͛  that austeƌitǇ itself ďeĐoŵes aĐĐeptaďle oƌ uŶaĐĐeptaďle;  ;ďͿ it is iŶ 
virtue of the redefinition present in these supporting premises that the consequences can emerge as non-
overridable in the process of weighing reasons. This also shows why it is possible to use a metaphorical 
ƌedefiŶitioŶ of austeƌitǇ as ͚ďloodďath͛ in favour of austerity (as in the Sun example): through its entailments, 
the metaphor will still support the counter-claim (austerity is not the right policy) via the premise which says 
that the consequences are unacceptable, but the weight of the latter is apparently overridden here by other 
reasons (the positive consequences).   
